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I. INTRODUCTION 
Section 7 of the Clayton Act was intended to arrest the anticompetitive 
effects of market power in their incipiency. The core question is 
whether a merger may substantially lessen competition, and necessarily 
requires a prediction of the merger’s impact on competition, present 
and future. The section can deal only with probabilities, not with 
certainties. And there is certainly no requirement that the 
anticompetitive power manifest itself in anticompetitive action before § 
7 can be called into play. If the enforcement of § 7 turned on the 
existence of actual anticompetitive practices, the congressional policy 
of thwarting such practices in their incipiency would be frustrated.1 
In this Article, we review the proposed $39 billion merger between 
AT&T and T-Mobile under federal merger law, under the United States 
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”)’s 
2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, and with a focus on possible remedies. 
We find, under a rule of law approach, that the proposed acquisition is 
presumptively anticompetitive, and the merging parties in their public 
disclosures have failed to overcome this presumption. Next, we find that 
under the Merger Guidelines, there is reason to believe that the transaction 
may result in higher prices to consumers under several different plausible 
theories. Finally, we turn to the question of possible remedies. We 
conclude that there is a high likelihood that divestitures will not solve the 
competitive problems and make the case for enjoining the acquisition. 
                                                                                                                 
1.  FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 577 (1967) (citations omitted). 
Number 1] AT&T/T-MOBILE 49 
On August 31, 2011, the United States brought an action to enjoin the 
merger.2 The government’s complaint was subsequently amended to 
include the claims of seven states and Puerto Rico as coplaintiffs.3 Two 
competitors also filed suit to enjoin the transaction and the defendants 
unsuccessfully moved to dismiss their complaints.4 The government’s case 
is scheduled to go to trial on February 13, 2012.5  
II. STANDARD FOR EVALUATING THE MERGER 
The starting point for any evaluation is the statute itself. Section 7 of 
the Clayton Act prohibits mergers and acquisitions when the effect of the 
transaction “may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create 
a monopoly.”6  
Contemporary merger law is forward looking. Courts are called upon 
to make judgments about the likely effects of a merger that has not yet 
taken place. Uncertainty and errors of both overenforcement and 
underenforcement are inevitable. Some observers counsel for lenient 
merger review, as they believe the market will invariably correct any 
mistakes because new firms will enter and market power will quickly 
disappear. But the lessons from the financial crisis call into question these 
empirically suspect beliefs.7 Markets do not always self-correct.8 Most 
                                                                                                                 
2. Complaint, United States v. AT&T, Inc. (2011), No. 11-01560, available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f274600/274613.htm. When we wrote and posted this 
article on SSRN, the DOJ was still investigating the merger.   
3. Second Amended Complaint, United States v. AT&T, Inc. (2011), No. 11-01560, 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f275700/275756.pdf [hereinafter Compl.].  
4. Cecilia Kang, Judge Allows Sprint Suit Against AT&T’s Merger With T-Mobile, 
WASH. POST (Nov. 3, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-tech/post/ judge-
allows-sprint-suit-against-atandts-merger-with-t-mobile/2011/11/03/gIQATxT5iM_blog.ht 
ml?wprss=post-tech. Although the complaints by Sprint and C Spire (formerly Cellular 
South) were not dismissed, they were significantly pared down by the court. Michael J. De 
La Merced, AT&T Moves to Dismiss Lawsuits by Sprint and Cellular South, N.Y. TIMES 
DEALBOOK, Sept. 30, 2011, http://dealbook.nytimes.com /2011/09/30/att-moves-to-dismiss-
lawsuits-by-sprint-and-cell-south/#sprint. 
5. Rachel King, AT&T Antitrust Case Gets February Trial Date, CNET NEWS (Sept. 
22, 2011, 7:46 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1035_3-20110079-94/at-t-antitrust-case-
gets-february-trial-date/. 
6. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006). 
7.  See RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF ’08 AND THE 
DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION (2009); PAUL KRUGMAN, THE RETURN OF DEPRESSION 
ECONOMICS AND THE CRISIS OF 2008 (2009). 
8.  See, e.g., KENNETH M. DAVIDSON, REALITY IGNORED: HOW MILTON FRIEDMAN 
AND CHICAGO ECONOMICS UNDERMINED AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS AND ENDANGERED THE 
GLOBAL ECONOMY (2011); JOHN CASSIDY, HOW MARKETS FAIL: THE LOGIC OF ECONOMIC 
CALAMITIES 59 (2009); JUSTIN FOX, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL MARKET: A HISTORY OF 
RISK, REWARD, AND DELUSION ON WALL STREET (2009); GEORGE A. AKERLOF & ROBERT J. 
SHILLER, ANIMAL SPIRITS: HOW HUMAN PSYCHOLOGY DRIVES THE ECONOMY, AND WHY IT 
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mergers do not yield significant efficiencies (which, if they did, would 
warrant a light touch approach to merger review).9  
Instead, in the current era of Too-Big-and-Integral-to-Fail, we can see 
how Congress in the aftermath of World War II got it right. In amending 
the Clayton Act, Congress saw the dangers of concentrated economic and 
political power, and sought to arrest these threats in their incipiency.10 
Thus, when evaluating mergers, the enforcers and the courts should respect 
Congress’s desires and err, if anything, on the side of enforcement. 
Enforcement under the Clayton Act must also consider whether there is a 
trend toward concentration. “Long-term trends in HHI changes,” the Fifth 
Circuit recently noted, “can be used to examine the structure of markets 
and are used to determine the effect of mergers on the market.”11 Where 
the market trends show that the merging parties “have been the dominant 
players in the relevant markets and do not indicate any trend of reduced 
concentration . . . ,” then a merger should be enjoined.12 An immediate 
danger of monopolization is not needed for a merger to be unlawful.13  
The merger law, by its own language and Congress’s intent, requires 
heightened scrutiny of mergers, especially those in already concentrated 
                                                                                                                 
MATTERS FOR GLOBAL CAPITALISM (2009); John Cassidy, Letter from Chicago: After the 
Blowup, NEW YORKER, Jan. 11, 2010, at 28, available at http://www.new 
yorker.com/reporting/2010/01/11/100111fa_fact_cassidy; Paul Krugman, How Did 
Economists Get It So Wrong?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2009, at 37, available at http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2009/09/06/magazine/06Economic-t.html?pagewanted=all (noting that 
more important than the economists’ failure to predict was “the profession’s blindness to the 
very possibility of catastrophic failures in a market economy”). 
9. See, e.g., Amanda P. Reeves & Maurice E. Stucke, Behavioral Antitrust, 86 IND. 
L.J. 1527, 1560–63 (2011); Spencer Weber Waller, Corporate Governance and Competition 
Policy, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 833, 873–79 (2011) (examining evidence from corporate 
finance that suggests entire categories of mergers are more likely to destroy, rather than 
enhance, shareholder value); Maurice E. Stucke, Behavioral Economists at the Gate: 
Antitrust in the Twenty-First Century, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 513, 573–75 (2007). 
10.  As the Court noted about the 1950 amendments to the Clayton Act, it was 
“apparent that a keystone in the erection of a barrier to what Congress saw was the rising 
tide of economic concentration, was its provision of authority for arresting mergers at a time 
when the trend to a lessening of competition in a line of commerce was still in its 
incipiency.” Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 347 (1962). The Court noted, 
“[t]hat § 7 of the Clayton Act was intended to reach incipient monopolies and trade 
restraints outside the scope of the Sherman Act was explicitly stated in the Senate Report on 
the original Act . . . . This theme was reiterated in congressional consideration of the 
amendments adopted in 1950, and found expression in the final House and Senate Reports 
on the measure.” Id. at 347 n.32 (citation omitted).  
 11. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. N.V. v. FTC, 534 F.3d 410, 432 n.12 (5th Cir. 2008). 
 12. Id. 
 13. Robert H. Lande, Resurrecting Incipiency: From Von's Grocery to Consumer 
Choice, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 875 (2001). 
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industries with entry barriers.14 Thus, the outcome for merger review 
should significantly differ than the outcome for evaluating antitrust 
restraints generally under the Sherman Act.  
III. THIS MERGER IS PRESUMPTIVELY ANTICOMPETITIVE 
Under well-established U.S. law, there is a strong presumption of 
illegality when the merging firms’ market shares are significant in an 
industry with high entry barriers. As the Supreme Court said,  
[A] merger which produces a firm controlling an undue percentage 
share of the relevant market, and results in a significant increase in the 
concentration of firms in that market is so inherently likely to lessen 
competition substantially that it must be enjoined in the absence of 
evidence clearly showing that the merger is not likely to have such 
anticompetitive effects.”15  
Consistent with the legislative intent of the Clayton Act, courts have 
regarded a transaction that would lead to further concentration in an already 
highly concentrated market as presumptively illegal under Section 7.16 In 
United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, the Court held that a merger 
resulting in a single firm controlling thirty percent of a market trending 
toward concentration in which four firms controlled seventy percent of the 
sales was presumptively illegal.17 Unless the merging parties “meet their 
burden of rebutting this presumption, the merger must be enjoined.”18 That 
                                                                                                                 
14. See United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363–68 (1963). 
 15. Id. 
 16. See, e.g., United States v. Cont’l Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 461 (1964); United States 
v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271, 278, 280 (1964); FTC v. Swedish Match, 131 
F. Supp. 2d 151 (D.D.C. 2000); FTC. v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 34, 53 
(D.D.C. 1998) (finding that “[r]egardless of how one were to define the relevant drug 
wholesale market, whether it would include business to all or only some of its customers, 
the merged firms would control a significant share of all of the markets.”); United States v. 
Ivaco, Inc., 704 F. Supp. 1409, 1419 (W.D. Mich. 1989). Measures of concentration have 
changed over the years. For the past three decades, the antitrust agencies have used the 
“Herfindahl-Hirschman Index” or HHI. HHI is calculated by summing the squares of the 
market shares of all firms in the industry. In doing so, it gives greater weight to the market 
shares of larger firms than the shares of smaller firms, reflecting the fact that larger firms are 
generally more competitively significant. Prior measures of concentration merely added the 
market shares of the industry’s largest companies. Thus, the “four firm concentration ratio” 
is the sum of the market shares of the four largest firms in an industry. 
 17. 374 U.S. at 364 (“Without attempting to specify the smallest market share which 
would still be considered to threaten undue concentration, we are clear that 30% presents 
that threat.”). Subsequent cases have lowered the presumption somewhat to even twenty-
five percent or less. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271, 275 
(1964) (aggregate market share 29.1%; acquired firm's market share 1.3%; four-firm 
concentration ratio 76%). 
 18. R.C. Bigelow, Inc. v. Unilever N.V., 867 F.2d 102, 108 (2d Cir. 1989); see also 
Swedish Match, 131 F. Supp. 2d at 151; Cmty. Publishers, Inc. v. Donrey Corp., 892 F. 
Supp. 1146 (W.D. Ark. 1995), aff’d 139 F.3d 1180 (8th Cir. 1998). 
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presumption applies to the AT&T/T-Mobile merger in an already highly 
concentrated industry with high-entry barriers. 
A. AT&T’s Postmerger Market Share Would Exceed Forty Percent 
The candidate product market is the market for “mobile wireless 
telecommunications services.”19 This was the market definition used in 
prior DOJ cases such as United States v. AT&T Inc.20 and United States v. 
Verizon Communications Inc.21 In those cases, DOJ noted that there were 
no cost-effective alternatives to mobile wireless telecommunications 
services, and it is unlikely that a sufficient number of customers would 
switch away from mobile wireless telecommunications services to make a 
small but significant nontransitory price increase in those services 
unprofitable.22 
This candidate product market includes voice, text messaging, and 
data services. The data component of mobile wireless services has been 
rapidly growing in the past few years. There has been a high smartphone 
adoption and upgrade rate (close to fifty percent in 2009 according to the 
FCC’s Fourteenth Mobile Wireless Competition Report).23 There has also 
been an expansion in the number of non-smartphone handsets that are 
subject to mandatory data plans. Data plans for mobile phones are typically 
sold as part of a bundle. At the end of the day, DOJ’s product market 
candidate, which includes voice, messaging, and data, is defensible.  
The candidate geographic markets include both local and national 
markets.24 Historically, viewed from the consumer perspective, geographic 
markets were local.25 This was because consumers purchasing mobile 
wireless telecommunications services chose among the providers that 
offered services where they lived, worked, and traveled on a regular 
                                                                                                                 
19. This is the product market alleged by the United States in its complaint. See 
Compl. at 7. 
 20. Complaint at 1, United States v. AT&T Inc., 541 F. Supp. 2d 2 (D.D.C. 2008) 
(No. 1:07-cv-01952), http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f227300/227306.pdf [hereinafter 
AT&T Compl.]. 
 21. Complaint at 1, United States v. Verizon Comm. Inc., 607 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 
2009) (No. 1:08-cv-00993), http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f233900/233928.pdf 
[hereinafter Verizon Compl.]. 
22.  See, e.g., AT&T Compl., supra note 20, at 2; Verizon Compl., supra note 21, at 2. 
 23. Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 
1993, Fourteenth Report, 25 F.C.C.R. 11407, para. 137, Chart 6 (WTB 2010), 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-10-81A1.pdf [hereinafter 14th 
Mobile Wireless Competition Report]. 
24.  Compl., supra note 3, at 9–12 (evaluating competition both at local level and 
nationwide competition across local markets). 
25.  Id. at 10. 
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basis.26 Historically, providers offered different promotions, discounts, 
calling plans, and equipment subsidies in different geographic areas, 
varying the price for customers by geographic area.27  
 By the end of 2008, however, there were four facilities-based mobile 
wireless service providers that industry observers typically described as 
“nationwide”: AT&T, Sprint Nextel, T-Mobile, and Verizon Wireless.28 In 
2008, all the nationwide operators launched unlimited national flat-rate 
calling plans.29 Consumers increasingly have shifted away from restricted 
plans that included separate roaming charges and into these unlimited 
service options, and the focus of price competition has shifted 
accordingly.30 It now appears that pricing is for the most part set nationally 
by the four nationwide carriers, and regional and local competitors do not 
act as significant constraints on national pricing. 
Indeed, in its FCC public interest statements in both the Dobson31 and 
Centennial32 acquisitions, AT&T acknowledged that the geographic market 
is national precisely for these reasons. As AT&T wrote in its Centennial 
statement, supported by a declaration from its Chief Marketing Officer, 
“[i]n the mainland U.S., AT&T establishes its rate plans and pricing on a 
national basis, without reference to market structure at the [Cellular Market 
Area] level.”33 AT&T’s statement continues: “One of AT&T’s objectives 
is to develop its rate plans, features and prices in response to competitive 
conditions and offerings at the national levels [sic]—primarily the plans 
offered by the other national carriers.”34 
Although pricing by the four nationwide operators appears to be 
largely national, there may be promotions or discounts (e.g., handset 
discounts) that occur on a local basis. At trial, the court will likely consider 
                                                                                                                 
26.  Id. at 9. 
27.  See, e.g., AT&T Compl., supra note 20; Compl., supra note 3, at 9. 
 28. 14th Mobile Wireless Competition Report, supra note 23, at para. 27. 
 29. Id. at para. 88. 
 30. Id. at para. 90. 
 31. AT&T, MERGER OF AT&T INC. AND DOBSON COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION, 
DESCRIPTION OF TRANSACTION, PUBLIC INTEREST SHOWING AND RELATED DEMONSTRATIONS 
(July 13, 2007) (filed with the FCC), available at https://wireless2.fcc.gov/UlsEntry 
/attachments/attachmentViewRD.jsp?applType=search&fileKey=688206512&attachmentK
ey=18223538&attachmentInd=applAttach. 
 32. AT&T, MERGER OF AT&T INC. AND CENTENNIAL COMMUNICATIONS CORP., 
DESCRIPTION OF TRANSACTION, PUBLIC INTEREST SHOWING AND RELATED DEMONSTRATIONS 
(Nov. 21, 2008) (filed with the FCC), available at https://wireless2.fcc.gov/UlsEntry/ 
attachments/attachmentViewRD.jsp;ATTACHMENTS=1N6VJL5K37mPzN1G7L2XKBP7
mC5jC50m96ttqVlHZr3GL1cyJSgx!-659400886!-849295342?applType=search&fileKey 
=843683410&attachmentKey=18355849&attachmentInd=applAttach. 
 33. Id. at 28. 
 34. Id.at 28–29. 
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how much of these promotions and discounts are driven by competition. 
The court will also consider how big a factor the local promotions and 
discounts play in the overall pricing picture of AT&T, T-Mobile, Verizon, 
and Sprint. For example, if a two-year wireless plan costs $1200 per year, 
but there is a fifty dollar discount available in some cities on a new phone, 
that would amount to about a two percent discount over two years and 
would probably be small enough not to undercut the overall national 
pricing picture. 
Viewed from the standpoint of business customers, where travel 
capabilities are important and contracts are negotiated, the same conclusion 
appears likely: the geographic market is national. Similarly, viewed from 
the standpoint of suppliers (e.g., handset manufacturers), the geographic 
market is undoubtedly national. It is interesting to note that, according to an 
AT&T executive, Apple apparently approached Verizon, Sprint, AT&T, 
and T-Mobile about the original iPhone.35  
Consequently, under this proposed market definition, the merging 
parties will have a significant market share. As Senator Herbert Kohl 
observed at the recent hearings on this merger, “The proposed merger 
between AT&T and T-Mobile will bring together two of the four remaining 
national cell phone carriers to create the nation’s largest cell phone 
network, with an estimated 43% market share. Should this deal be 
approved, AT&T and Verizon will control close to 80% of the national cell 
phone market.”36 Under the Merger Guidelines, the merger would 
significantly increase concentration in the already concentrated national 
market and in ninety-seven of the top one hundred local markets.37 
B. Entry Barriers Are High 
Entry into the market of mobile wireless telecommunications services 
requires either (a) building out a network and obtaining spectrum rights, a 
slow process with high capital costs, or (b) piggy-backing on an existing 
provider, which is quicker but potentially more constrained (since network 
access, contract terms, and growth are all subject to a competitor’s 
willingness to contract).38  
                                                                                                                 
 35. See Lafayette Policy Studies Program, Jacoby Lecture, YOUTUBE, 17:50 (April 11, 
2011), http://www.youtube.com/user/lafayettepolicystds#p/u/0/j6Pqp40rigo. 
 36. Press Release, Senator Herb Kohl, Statement of U.S. Senator Herb Kohl on the 
AT&T/T-Mobile Merger (May, 11, 2011), http://kohl.senate.gov/newsroom/pressrelease 
.cfm?customel_dataPageID_1464=4452. 
37.  Compl., supra note 3, at 12–14. 
38. See 14th Mobile Wireless Competition Report, supra note 23, at paras. 60 
(facilities based entry), 36, n.91 (mobile virtual network operators); Compl. at 21 (“To 
replace the competition that would be lost from AT&T’s elimination of T-Mobile as an 
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The inputs necessary to enter include spectrum, towers, network 
equipment, and backhaul facilities. We doubt there can be a serious claim 
that entry is easy. Moreover, as Tim Wu discusses in his book, The Master 
Switch, there is apparently reason to be skeptical of AT&T’s willingness to 
grant competitors reasonable access to its network.39  
C. The Incipiency Standard 
For the past thirty years or so, DOJ has looked at deals one at a time, 
and has not made use of Section 7’s “incipiency” standard,40 which 
requires the antitrust enforcers to nip concentration in the bud.41 Nor has 
DOJ examined trends toward concentration, and the likely impact that such 
concentration would have on the overall competitiveness of an industry. 
The 2010 revisions to the Horizontal Merger Guidelines have changed this 
approach. The Merger Guidelines now refer to the Congressional intent 
“that merger enforcement should interdict competitive problems in their 
incipiency and that certainty about anticompetitive effect is seldom 
possible and not required for a merger to be illegal.”42  
Indeed, ignoring the Clayton Act’s incipiency standard raises 
significant rule-of-law concerns. Congress, in passing Section 7 and in 
amending it with the Celler-Kefauver Anti-Merger Amendments, “was 
concerned with arresting concentration in the American economy, whatever 
its cause, in its incipiency.”43 To halt the “‘rising tide’ of concentration in 
American business,” Congress decided “‘to clamp down with vigor on 
                                                                                                                 
independent competitor, moreover, a new entrant would need to have nationwide spectrum, 
a national network, scale economies that arise from having tens of millions of customers, 
and a strong brand, as well as other valued characteristics.”). 
 39. TIM WU, THE MASTER SWITCH: THE RISE AND FALL OF INFORMATION EMPIRES 
245–49 (2011). 
40. A search of the DOJ Antitrust Division website produced a few court cases where 
the United States mentioned the incipiency standard including some recent instances. See 
Plaintiffs’ Proposed Conclusions of Law, United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d. 
1098 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (No. C 04-0807 VRW), www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f204500/204558 
.pdf; Plaintiff United States of America’s Motion to Strike Defendants' Efficiencies 
Defense, United States v. Northwest Airlines Corp., No. 98-74611 (E.D. Mich. 2000), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f4500/4542.htm; Memorandum of United 
States in Support of Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and a Preliminary 
Injunction, United States v. Franklin Electric Co., 130 F. Supp. 2d 1025 (W.D. Wisc. 2000), 
www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f4800/4883.pdf. 
41. United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 589, 593 (1957). 
 42. U.S. Dep’t of Justice & FTC, Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 1 (2010), available 
at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.html [hereinafter 2010 Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines]. 
 43. United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546, 552 (1966). 
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mergers.’”44 Congress’s premise was that mergers tend to accelerate 
concentration in an industry:  
The use of these words [“may be”] means that the bill, if enacted, 
would not apply to the mere possibility but only to the reasonable 
probability of the prescribed [sic] effect * * *. The words ‘may be’ 
have been in section 7 of the Clayton Act since 1914. The concept of 
reasonable probability conveyed by these words is a necessary element 
in any statute which seeks to arrest restraints of trade in their 
incipiency and before they develop into full-fledged restraints violative 
of the Sherman Act. A requirement of certainty and actuality of injury 
to competition is incompatible with any effort to supplement the 
Sherman Act by reaching incipient restraints.45 
 With the rise of the Chicago School in the late 1970s, it became 
fashionable among antitrust economists and lawyers to dismiss the 
incipiency standard as outdated. Before the financial crisis, the 
conventional wisdom was that antitrust enforcers and courts could (and 
should) use concentration only as a screen: the antitrust agencies would 
challenge only those few mergers that, under the prevailing economic 
thinking, would demonstrably lead to a postmerger price increase.46 It 
came to the point where the agencies seemed obligated not only to prove 
that a merger would cause prices to rise postmerger, but also explain the 
chain of events that would lead to the postmerger price increase (either 
unilateral or coordinated effects) and the likely magnitude of the price 
increase.47  
It is difficult to imagine how a DOJ or FTC attorney, even one with 
an MBA, could be expected to meet this burden. For some industries, 
anticompetitive effects may be relatively easy to predict; but in other 
industries, making such predictions is a fool’s errand. The merging parties’ 
documents may be useful, but repeat players before the agencies can be 
expected to know what to put into, and what to leave out of, their planning 
documents. Indeed, any well-counseled firm that plans to continue to grow 
through mergers knows this lesson very well. 
The revised Merger Guidelines now state, in discussing coordinated 
effects, that this level of predictive causation is not called for: “Pursuant to 
                                                                                                                 
 44. Id. at 552 (quoting United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 276 (1966)). 
 45. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323 n.39 (1962) (quoting Senator 
Reed from the Congressional Record). 
 46. Lawrence M. Frankel, The Flawed Institutional Design of U.S. Merger Review: 
Stacking the Deck Against Enforcement, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 159, 159 (2008). 
 47. See, e.g., United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1165 (N.D. Cal. 
2004) (misconstruing the Clayton Act’s incipiency standard, the trial court held that 
“[w]ithout the benefit of presumptions, the burden remains upon plaintiffs to come forward 
with evidence of actual anticompetitive effects.”). 
Number 1] AT&T/T-MOBILE 57 
the Clayton Act’s incipiency standard, the Agencies may challenge mergers 
that in their judgment pose a real danger of harm through coordinated 
effects, even without specific evidence showing precisely how the 
coordination likely would take place.”48  
 This recognition does much to bring the agencies back into line with 
the law. Congress and the courts have recognized that some economists and 
lawyers might believe that the disappearance of smaller competitors and 
greater industry concentration are bound to occur whether mergers are 
prohibited or not.49 But this is not their decision to make. As the Supreme 
Court noted, “it is not for the courts to review the policy decision of 
Congress that mergers which may substantially lessen competition are 
forbidden, which in effect the courts would be doing should they now 
require proof of the congressional premise that mergers are a major cause 
of concentration.”50 Nor should it be left to the whim of the particular court 
or agency official to decide whether a trend toward concentration in an 
industry, whatever its causes, is a relevant factor in deciding whether the 
merger violates the Clayton Act. Congress determined that the trend toward 
concentration is a highly relevant factor. 
 Under the incipiency standard, the AT&T/T-Mobile merger is highly 
problematic. The typical local market for mobile wireless services is 
already highly concentrated and the trend prior to this acquisition has been 
toward greater concentration.51 The FCC states that concentration has 
increased thirty-two percent since 2003 and six and a half percent in the 
most recent year for which data is available.52 The weighted average HHI 
(weighted by “Economic Area” population which is an aggregation of 
counties including the “node” and the surrounding areas economically 
related to the node) was 2848 in 2008, an increase from 2674 in 2007.53 
The weighted average HHI has increased by nearly 700 since the FCC first 
calculated this metric in 2003.54 On a national basis, the trend toward 
concentration is equally apparent. 
To see the impact of the incipiency standard on merger review, take 
as an example Aluminum Company of America’s acquisition of a small 
                                                                                                                 
 48. 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 42, § 7.1. 
49.  United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546, 552 (1966) (noting how 
“[m]any believe . . . that the disappearance of small businesses with a correlative 
concentration of business in the hands of a few is bound to occur whether mergers are 
prohibited or not.”). 
 50. Id.  
51.  Compl., supra note 3, at paras. 22–23. 
 52. See 14th Mobile Wireless Competition Report, supra note 23, at 6. 
 53. See id. at 15; as to how HHIs are calculated, see supra note 16. 
54.  See 14th Mobile Wireless Competition Report, supra note 23, at 15. 
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competitor, Rome Cable Corporation.55 The Court noted that the 
acquisition gave the dominant firm Alcoa only 1.3% additional control of 
the aluminum conductor line market.56 Indeed, although Rome was an 
aggressive competitor, it was unlikely that Alcoa could significantly 
increase its market power.57 If the agencies or courts ignored the incipiency 
standard and required proof of the specific anticompetitive effects 
postmerger, then the dominant firms could acquire their smaller rivals one 
at a time, notwithstanding the federal antitrust law. It is unlikely that DOJ 
could prove why and how prices would increase as a result of this merger, 
or the magnitude of the price increase. But this standard, besides being 
unrealistic, contravenes the legislative intent. In the Alcoa-Rome Cable 
merger, the Court did not ramble through the wilds of economic theory. 
Instead, the Court turned to the statute and its legislative history: the 
Committee Reports on Section 7 show, with respect to the Celler-Kefauver 
Amendments in 1950, that “the objective was to prevent accretions of 
power which ‘are individually so minute as to make it difficult to use the 
Sherman Act test against them.’”58 Thus, under the incipiency standard, 
“[i]t would seem that the situation in the aluminum industry may be 
oligopolistic. As that condition develops, the greater is the likelihood that 
parallel policies of mutual advantage, not competition, will emerge. That 
tendency may well be thwarted by the presence of small but significant 
competitors.”59 While, for some, Alcoa may be an extreme example, it 
illustrates a valid point. Incipiency is not a novel concept for the courts. 60  
                                                                                                                 
55.  United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am, 377 U.S. 271, 272–73 (1964). 
56.  Id. at 273–74 (finding that Rome in the year prior to the merger produced “0.3% 
of total industry production of bare aluminum conductor, 4.7% of insulated aluminum 
conductor, and 1.3% of the broader aluminum conductor line.”). That same year, Alcoa 
“produced 32.5% of the bare aluminum conductor, 11.6% of insulated aluminum conductor, 
and 27.8% of aluminum conductor.” Id. at 274; see also id. at 280 (“The acquisition of 
Rome added, it is said, only 1.3% to Alcoa's control of the aluminum conductor market.”). 
57. The Court was clearly concerned about the trend toward concentration. It noted 
how “[i]t would seem that the situation in the aluminum industry may be oligopolistic.” Id. 
at 280. The Court was concerned of the “likelihood that parallel policies of mutual 
advantage, not competition, will emerge” in this industry. Id. This trend toward oligopoly, 
observed the Court “may well be thwarted by the presence of small but significant 
competitors.” Id. (emphasis added). Moreover, the evidentiary record showed that Rome 
“was an aggressive competitor.” Id. at 281. 
 58. Id. at 280 (citations omitted). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Section 8 of the Clayton Act, which prohibits interlocking directorates, also 
employs an incipiency standard. Courts have long recognized that the purpose behind 
Section 8 was “to nip in the bud incipient violations of the antitrust laws by removing the 
opportunity or temptation to such violations through interlocking directorates.” United 
States v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 111 F. Supp. 614, 616 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).  
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 Indeed, the incipiency standard places antitrust on surer footing under 
rule of law principles, than having the agencies or generalist courts trying 
to predict what in many industries is unpredictable. As the Court has long 
recognized, the relevant economic data are “both complex and elusive.”61 
If the legality of a merger rises and falls on the ability of the agencies to 
prove the nature and magnitude of the postmerger anticompetitive effects, 
then business executives will not know which mergers would likely be 
blocked. Such a vague, fact-specific rule of reason analysis would benefit 
antitrust lawyers and economists (and data production teams to comply 
with the onerous Second Request for “additional information and 
documentary material relevant to the proposed acquisition.”).62 But merger 
law is now nothing more than haphazard merger predictions, which raises 
significant rule-of-law concerns, “[a]nd unless businessmen can assess the 
legal consequences of a merger with some confidence, sound business 
planning is retarded.”63 Under the current incipiency standard and 
presumption, the merging parties (and antitrust agencies to the extent they 
permit such mergers to go through) must produce evidence clearly showing 
that the merger is unlikely to have anticompetitive effects.64 The evidence 
should be so clear that citizens and Congress are confident that the risks 
inherent in the transaction are insignificant, and the procompetitive benefits 
are significant.65 If the merging parties (and antitrust agencies) fail to 
overcome this presumption, then there is little confidence that the law is 
being enforced as it should be. 
The Philadelphia National Bank presumption is not only consistent 
with congressional intent (in preventing a too broad of an economic 
investigation), but it provides firms, especially those in concentrated 
industries, some guidance as to whether they or their competitors can 
merge (without running afoul of the Clayton Act). Indeed, it can re-channel 
                                                                                                                 
 61. United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 362 (1963). 
 62. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(e)(1)(A) (2000). 
 63. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. at 362. 
64.  See, e.g., Christian Schmidt Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., Inc., 600 
F. Supp. 1326, 1330 (E.D. Mich. 1985) (“In evaluating this evidence, [courts] must keep in 
mind the Supreme Court's instruction that a merger which produces a firm with an undue 
market share and significantly increases concentration in the industry ‘is so inherently likely 
to lessen competition substantially that it must be enjoined in the absence of evidence 
clearly showing that the merger is not likely to have such anti-competitive effects.’”) 
(quoting United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (emphasis added 
by district court), aff'd, 753 F.2d 1354 (6th Cir. 1985). 
65. See, e.g., Tasty Baking Co. v. Ralston Purina, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 1250, 1264 (E.D. 
Pa. 1987) (defendants can overcome presumption with significant evidence “that the 
market-share statistics g[i]ve an inaccurate account of the acquisition['s] probable effects on 
competition”) (quoting United States v. Citizens & Southern National Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 
120 (1975)). 
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some of the wasted costs in lobbying policymakers66 (and fees to 
investment bankers) that arise from merger waves. Knowing that the 
merger is presumptively illegal, and knowing that the evidentiary showing 
to overcome this presumption is significant, many large firms in 
concentrated industries recognize that neither they nor their significant 
competitors can further increase industry concentration with another 
merger. This can increase their incentives to grow organically through 
superior internal efficiencies, technologies, services, and offerings.  
Consequently, under well-established U.S. law, there is a strong 
presumption of illegality when the merging firm’s market share exceeds 
thirty percent in a highly concentrated industry with high entry barriers. As 
we examine below, the merging parties (through their public disclosures at 
least) have not overcome this strong presumption of illegality. 
IV. THE MERGING PARTIES HAVE NOT OVERCOME THE 
PRESUMPTION OF ILLEGALITY 
A. The Merging Parties Have Not Established That Consumers 
Will Overall Benefit with Merger Specific Efficiencies 
“Although the Supreme Court has not sanctioned the use of the 
efficiencies defense in a section 7 merger case, the trend among lower 
courts is to recognize the defense.”67 Based on the publicly available 
information, it is unlikely that AT&T will overcome this presumption of 
anti-competitive harm with an efficiencies defense. Instead we find: (i) 
many of the efficiencies that AT&T claims are not “merger specific” and 
thus not “cognizable” under the agencies’ Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 
and (ii) to obtain efficiencies in one part of the merged company (i.e., on 
the AT&T side), the company will need to cause harm somewhere else 
(i.e., on the T-Mobile side).  
 The merger does not really expand wireless coverage area for 
customers. Apparently the coverage profiles of AT&T and T-Mobile are 
fairly similar, so it is unlikely that combining the companies will create 
significant improvements in coverage area.68 The latest buzz is 4G wireless 
technologies, which offer theoretical download speeds of 100 Mbps, with 
the technology based on orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing 
                                                                                                                 
66.  See Maurice E. Stucke, Crony Capitalism and Antitrust, CPI ANTITRUST 
CHRONICLE (forthcoming 2011) (discussing AT&T and T-Mobile’s lobbying efforts to gain 
approval of their merger) (abstract available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1942045).  
 67. FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 720 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). 
68.  See Jessica Dolcourt, AT&T and T-Mobile: By the Numbers, CNET (Mar. 20, 
2011), http://www.cnet.com/8301-17918_1-20045216-85.html. 
Number 1] AT&T/T-MOBILE 61 
(“OFDM”).69 To the extent that the merger allegedly gives T-Mobile a 
“clear path” to 4G services, this is not merger-specific. Just giving 
customers of one of the merging parties access to something that the other 
party offers is not a merger-specific efficiency. Customers who value that 
feature could switch to the other provider absent the merger. Moreover, if 
there is evidence that T-Mobile was independently working on the 
equivalent of 4G (and there is here), then this undercuts the efficiency 
defense. The argument that T-Mobile has “no clear path” towards 4G only 
begs the question: in a competitive environment, under the rigors of 
competition, T-Mobile needs to find such a path.70 The lack of a “clear 
path” is an incentive to innovate and compete harder. The asserted benefit 
of the merger, from T-Mobile’s standpoint, is that AT&T can migrate T-
Mobile users to its network. This is not a true efficiency because the choice 
is already part of a price-quality tradeoff for consumers. 
To the extent that the merger gives AT&T needed spectrum, there are 
less anticompetitive alternatives for AT&T to get more spectrum. One 
argument in favor of the merger is that AT&T is running out of spectrum as 
data-hungry users are using what AT&T currently offers.71 But there are 
other ways for AT&T to get needed spectrum that would not harm 
competition. The irony should not be lost on anyone that the video and 
music needs of a segment of AT&T customers appear to be the driving 
force of this merger. In order to satisfy those needs, AT&T is proposing to 
restructure the industry. 
One efficiency that may be associated with the acquisition is that it 
will give the merged firm more spectrum options, which will allow it to 
deploy spectrum most efficiently. Not all spectrum is created equally, and 
thus there may be benefits to both T-Mobile and AT&T if they are able to 
redeploy spectrum. As the FCC noted: 
[S]pectrum resources in different frequency bands have distinguishing 
features that can make some frequency bands more valuable or better 
suited for particular purposes. For instance, given the superior 
propagation characteristics of spectrum under 1 GHz, particularly for 
providing coverage in rural areas and for penetrating buildings, 
                                                                                                                 
69.  Marguerite Reardon, Which 4G Service Is Right For You? (FAQ), CNET NEWS 
(Dec. 3, 2010, 4:00 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-30686_3-20024511-266.html# 
ixzz1Muvdpsuq. 
70. References to T-Mobile’s alleged lack of a “clear path” to Long Term Evolution 
(“LTE”) appear repeatedly in AT&T’s public interest statement. See AT&T, ACQUISITION 
OF T-MOBILE USA, INC. BY AT&T INC.: DESCRIPTION OF TRANSACTION, PUBLIC INTEREST 
SHOWING AND RELATED DEMONSTRATIONS 1, 5, 13, 19, 30–32, 41, 43, 71, 102 (Apr. 21, 
2011) [hereinafter AT&T SUBMISSION] (filed with the FCC), https://prodnet.www.neca. 
org/publicationsdocs/wwpdf/42111att.pdf. 
71. See AT&T’s Answer, United States v. AT&T, Inc. (2011), No. 11-01560. 
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providers whose spectrum assets include a greater amount of spectrum 
below 1 GHz spectrum may possess certain competitive advantages for 
providing robust coverage when compared to licensees whose portfolio 
is exclusively or primarily comprised of higher frequency spectrum. As 
discussed above, holding a mix of frequency ranges may be optimal 
from the perspective of providing the greatest service quality at low 
cost. 
The spectrum holdings in the industry as of 2009 were as follows:72 
Percentage Spectrum Holdings, Measured on a MHz POPs Basis by 
Provider, by Frequency Band* 
(Providers Listed by Number of Subscribers as of 2Q 2009) 
 
Licensee 
700 
MHz 
Cellular 
(850 
MHz) 
SMR 
(800/900 
MHz) 
PCS 
(1.9 GHz) 
AWS 
(1.7/2.1 
GHz) 
BRS 
(2.5 GHz) 
EBS 
Leases 
(2.5 GHz) 
Verizon 
Wireless 
42.7% 48.5% 0.0% 15.4% 15.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
AT&T 24.3% 42.3% 0.0% 25.9% 11.2% 0.0% 0.0% 
Sprint Nextel 0.0% 0.0% 93.0%* 26.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
T-Mobile 0.0% 0.0%** 0.0% 19.7% 27.5% 0.0% 0.0% 
MetroPCS 0.5% 0.0% 0.0% 2.6% 5.9% 0.0% 0.0% 
US Cellular 2.7% 4.3% 0.0% 1.8% 2.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Leap 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 2.3% 8.8% 0.0% 0.0% 
Other 29.8% 4.9% 7.0%* 5.5% 29.6% 13.7%* 38.0%* 
Clearwire 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 86.3%* 62.0%* 
Grand Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
* These are estimates based on the available data. 
** T-Mobile holds a very small amount of Cellular spectrum. 
T-Mobile’s spectrum holdings are almost entirely above 1 GHz. This 
suggests, at a minimum, that AT&T’s commitment to build out its network 
in rural areas is largely independent of anything it is gaining in the 
acquisition. T-Mobile’s spectrum holdings are not well-suited for rural 
build-outs. Rather, this promise seems to be politically driven and aimed at 
senators and representatives from largely rural states. As a cost of getting 
support for the transaction, AT&T is willing to spend more on rural 
markets. Merger critics point out that Verizon already plans to cover more 
than ninety percent of the U.S. population with 4G LTE service by 2013,73 
                                                                                                                 
72. 14th Mobile Wireless Competition Report, supra note 23, at 148, Table 25. 
73. See Petition to Deny of Public Knowledge and Future of Music Coalition at 59–
60, Applications of AT&T Inc. and Deutsche Telekom AG (No. 11-65) (2011), http://www. 
publicknowledge.org/files/docs/pk_fmc-att_tmo-petition_to_deny.pdf. 
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and competition, rather than promises, is what is likely to cause AT&T to 
increase its own coverage.74  
On the other hand, at least parts of T-Mobile’s spectrum, licenses, and 
probably towers are valuable in the urban areas where AT&T is apparently 
having network difficulties. The likely argument is that both firms will 
benefit by redeployment of assets. Of course, this same argument can be 
used whenever firms have to compete for scarce inputs, and no firm wins 
all the auctions. Critics have contended that AT&T could take the money it 
is spending on the acquisition and spend it on network improvements, and 
that would be a more procompetitive outcome. 
AT&T’s efficiency argument essentially comes down to this: what is 
good for AT&T is good for the United States. It equates its increase in 
dominance, and its elimination of a significant competitor, as somehow 
proconsumer, proinnovation and proinvestment. AT&T’s lead filing with 
the FCC contains dire predictions if its merger is blocked. AT&T predicts 
that consumers will confront “lower output, worse quality, and higher 
prices.”75 It alleges that preventing its acquisition of T-Mobile would risk 
“degrading service for millions of American consumers, undermining the 
virtuous cycle of mobile broadband innovation, and imperiling U.S. 
technological leadership.”76 It warns that prohibiting its merger will cause 
AT&T to have capacity problems, which “could have ripple effects 
throughout the broadband ecosystem.”77 It also warns that absent the 
merger, consumers would face even “more dropped and blocked calls, 
slower speeds, and access to fewer and less advanced applications.”78  
It is entirely rational for AT&T to equate its corporate interests with 
America’s interest. Indeed, this attitude suggests that America is already 
too dependent upon AT&T, and, thus, must allow the company to grow 
even bigger. But this is not the mindset of consumers or society. Rather 
what is good for America is good for AT&T. And what is good for 
America generally means more, rather than less, competition. If spectrum 
is, as AT&T argues, a scarce resource, then all competitors are confronted 
with this scarcity. While AT&T argues that dominant firms should grow 
bigger by acquiring their competitors’ spectrum, that is not necessarily in 
our country’s best interest. Instead, the fundamental belief is that 
                                                                                                                 
74. See The Effect of AT&T’s Acquisition of T-Mobile is Likely to Substantially Lessen 
Competition, AMERICAN ANTITRUST INSTITUTE, 3 (August 2011), http://www.antitrust 
institute.org/~antitrust/sites/default/files/White%20paper.pdf. 
 75. AT&T SUBMISSION, supra note 70, at 71. 
 76. Id. at 14.  
 77. Id. at 62. 
 78. Id. at 6. 
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competition forces companies to better allocate scarce resources.79 AT&T 
complains that, unlike its competitors, it supports multiple generations of 
technology, and this “severely constrains its flexibility to use its spectrum 
with optimal efficiency.”80 AT&T claims that migrating its customers to 
new handsets takes too much time.81 But the remedy for AT&T’s dilemma 
is not to acquire its competitor to address its own inefficiencies. Instead, 
AT&T must do better, and find better ways to innovate to serve its 
customers. In a competitive environment, if AT&T falls behind, it risks 
losing customers to more nimble competitors. In a less competitive 
environment, these customers have correspondingly fewer options.  
There is another reason to be wary of AT&T’s belief that what serves 
its corporate interests benefits Americans. Notwithstanding its claims of 
being an innovation pioneer, AT&T was “the lowest-scoring cell-phone 
carrier in the U.S., according to a satisfaction survey of 58,000 
ConsumerReports.org readers.”82 Of all the carriers rated, AT&T was the 
only one to drop significantly in overall satisfaction. While AT&T points 
out that it introduced Apple’s iPhone,83 Consumer Reports recently found 
“iPhone owners were, by far, the least satisfied” with AT&T.84  
Given the high market concentration levels and the trend toward 
concentration in this case, the lower court case law requires that AT&T and 
T-Mobile provide “proof of extraordinary efficiencies, which the [merging 
parties] failed to supply . . . . [E]fficiencies almost never justify a merger to 
monopoly or near-monopoly.”85 Moreover, given the high concentration 
levels and the business86 and behavioral economics literature87 on the 
                                                                                                                 
79. See, e.g., William J. Kolasky, What Is Competition? A Comparison of the U.S. 
and European Perspectives, 49 ANTITRUST BULL. 29, 35 (2004) (“[C]ompetition is the 
process by which market forces operate freely to assure that society's scarce resources are 
employed as efficiently as possible to maximize total economic welfare.”); William J. 
Kolasky & Andrew R. Dick, The Merger Guidelines and the Integration of Efficiencies into 
Antitrust Review of Horizontal Mergers, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 207, 208 (2003) (“The 
fundamental reason we favor competition over monopoly is that competition tends to drive 
markets to a more efficient use of scarce resources.”).  
 80. AT&T SUBMISSION, supra note 70, at 24. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Consumer Reports cell-service Ratings: AT&T is the worst carrier, CONSUMER 
REPORTS (Dec. 6, 2010, 2:08 PM), http://news.consumerreports.org/electronics/2010/12/ 
consumer-reports-cell-phone-survey-att-worst.html.  
 83. AT&T SUBMISSION, supra note 70, at 2. 
 84. Andrew Dowell, Consumer Reports Says AT&T 'Worst-Rated' U.S. Carrier, 
WALL ST. J., (Dec. 7, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article_email/SB100014240527487041 
56304576003423395003238-lMyQjAxMTAxMDIwMjEyNDIyWj.html. 
 85. FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 720 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (relying on the 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines). 
86. DAVIDSON, supra note 8, at 64; Waller, Corporate Governance, supra note 9, at 
873–79 (examining evidence from corporate finance that suggests entire categories of 
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failure of many mergers to provide any significant value to shareholders or 
consumers, the courts should, and likely would, “undertake a rigorous 
analysis of the kinds of efficiencies being urged by the parties in order to 
ensure that those ‘efficiencies’ represent more than mere speculation and 
promises about postmerger behavior.”88  
B. AT&T and T-Mobile Have Not Rebutted the Presumption That 
the Significant Increase in Concentration in an Already Highly 
Concentrated Industry Will Increase the Likelihood of Tacit 
Collusion. 
As the D.C. Circuit said, “[t]he combination of a concentrated market 
and barriers to entry is a recipe for price coordination.”89 AT&T and T-
Mobile have not rebutted this presumption. To successfully rebut the 
ordinary presumption that either tacit or express collusion increases in a 
highly concentrated industry postmerger, the merging parties would have to 
establish with credible evidence that “[s]tructural market barriers to 
collusion” are unique to their industry.90 The merging parties have not 
shown why their industry is so unique that by removing a significant 
competitor like T-Mobile will not make it easier to collude tacitly 
postmerger.  
Section 7.1 of the Merger Guidelines defines the general conditions 
necessary for coordinated effects: 
Pursuant to the Clayton Act’s incipiency standard, the Agencies may 
challenge mergers that in their judgment pose a real danger of harm 
through coordinated effects, even without specific evidence showing 
precisely how the coordination likely would take place. The Agencies 
are likely to challenge a merger if the following three conditions are all 
met: (1) the merger would significantly increase concentration and lead 
to a moderately or highly concentrated market; (2) that market shows 
signs of vulnerability to coordinated conduct (see Section 7.2); and (3) 
                                                                                                                 
mergers are more likely to destroy, rather than enhance, shareholder value); Clayton M. 
Christensen et al., The Big Idea: The New M&A Playbook, HARV. BUS. REV., Mar. 2011, at 
49 (“study after study puts the failure rate of mergers and acquisitions somewhere between 
70% and 90%”); Walter Adams & James W. Brock, Antitrust and Efficiency: A Comment, 
62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1116, 1117 n.8 (1987) (collecting earlier studies). 
87. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, The Behavioral Economics of Mergers and 
Acquisitions, 12 TENN. J. BUS. L. 65, 71–74 (2011), available at http://trace.tennessee. 
edu/transactions/vol12/iss2/4; Ulrike Malmendier, A “New” Paradigm in Corporate 
Finance: The Role of Managers and Managerial Biases, 4 NBER REPORTER 13, 15–16 
(2010), available at http://www.nber.org/reporter/2010number4/ulrike.html (collecting and 
discussing earlier field studies that correlate between overconfidence and acquisitions by 
cash-rich firms not dependent on external financing). 
 88. H.J. Heinz, 246 F.3d at 721. 
 89. Id. at 724. 
 90. Id. 
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the Agencies have a credible basis on which to conclude that the 
merger may enhance that vulnerability. An acquisition eliminating a 
maverick firm (see Section 2.1.5) in a market vulnerable to coordinated 
conduct is likely to cause adverse coordinated effects.91 
As we discuss in Part III, the industry is already highly concentrated. 
Moreover, there is no evidence of structural barriers to collusion. The few 
remaining firms can quickly detect and punish any attempt to increase 
competition by reducing price. In this industry, pricing and other terms of 
sale are highly transparent and are easily compared. These terms include: 
monthly fee; coverage area; included minutes, text, and data; overage and 
roaming charges; length of contract; penalties; activation fee; and optional 
features. 
The condition that there be rapid responses by rivals also appears to 
be true. One critic of the acquisition (FreePress) states that AT&T and 
Verizon “have a long history of raising prices in concert, as they both did 
early last year [2010] by requiring all customers on feature phones to add 
data plans.”92  
The FCC gives another example of how transparency affects price 
competition in its Fourteenth Mobile Wireless Competition Report. The 
example is particularly noteworthy. It shows how T-Mobile, acting as a 
price-cutter, prompted AT&T and Verizon to narrow their price premium 
on unlimited service offerings: 
91. Unlimited Calling Plans. The focus of price competition now 
appears to be shifting to unlimited service offerings. In an effort to 
reduce churn, T-Mobile introduced a lower-priced version of its 
unlimited national voice calling plan in the first quarter of 2009, but 
limited its availability to select existing customers. With the 
subsequent launch of its new “Even More” plans in October 2009, T-
Mobile reset prices on tiered offerings at significant discounts to its 
legacy plans, and brought its pricing structure more closely into line 
with that of Sprint Nextel, the least expensive nationwide service 
provider. The biggest pricing changes were made on T-Mobile’s 
unlimited service offerings, which include bundled voice, text and data 
offerings as well as an unlimited voice-only calling plan. At the same 
time, T-Mobile discontinued its myFaves unlimited calling circle offer. 
92. Even before T-Mobile launched its new pricing plans, Verizon 
Wireless and AT&T priced their postpaid service offerings at a 
premium relative to those of T-Mobile and Sprint Nextel. According to 
analysts, this premium reflected the willingness of consumers to pay 
higher prices for access to preferred handsets and data offerings, and in 
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Verizon Wireless’s case, positive perceptions of its network. T-
Mobile’s price changes appear to have prompted Verizon Wireless and 
AT&T to narrow the price premium on unlimited service offerings. In 
January 2010, Verizon Wireless reduced the prices of its unlimited 
voice plans for both individual and shared family offerings. Later the 
same day, AT&T responded to Verizon Wireless’s changes with 
matching price reductions on its unlimited voice plans. While Verizon 
Wireless’s and AT&T’s unlimited plan price cuts were significant, 
their postpaid service offerings remained the most expensive in the 
industry, even following these price changes, as the prices of Sprint 
Nextel’s and T-Mobile’s equivalent or comparable unlimited plans had 
already declined sharply.93 
Comparison of Unlimited Pricing Plans94 
 Verizon Wireless AT&T T-Mobile Sprint Nextel 
Voice $69.99 $69.99 $59.99 Not offered 
Voice + Text $89.99 $89.99 $69.99 Not offered 
Voice + Text + Basic Data $99.99 $99.99 $79.99 Not offered 
Voice + Text + Smartphone Data $119.99 $119.99 $99.99 $99.99 
 
There are probably many other examples of competitive moves and 
responses over time. They may involve the introduction and pricing of 
calling plans, commitment periods and penalties, pricing for subsidized 
handsets, and so forth. In each of these dimensions, the market is fully 
transparent to a competitor.  
The merging parties may argue that tacit collusion is unlikely, 
because, postmerger, Sprint would become the maverick firm and undercut 
any attempt by AT&T and Verizon to raise prices, reduce consumer 
choices, or decrease their incentives to innovate. Sprint’s incentives to 
serve as a maverick would arguably change, however, after a merger. 
Sprint may conclude that it would do better by going along with AT&T and 
Verizon than by trying to undercut them and gain customers. It may be 
possible to model the gains to Sprint depending on which strategy it 
pursued.  
Nor has AT&T established that other firms would restore competition 
postmerger. Other than Sprint and Verizon, the other firms in the market 
are so small, so capacity constrained, or so dependent on Verizon and 
AT&T that they would not be likely to act as a check on coordinated 
interaction.95  
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1.  Handset Competition and Innovation  
The merger will also likely lead to less choice and higher prices to 
consumers for handsets, and will give AT&T more power over handset 
suppliers. Price and nonprice competition among the mobile wireless 
handset manufacturers, according to the FCC, affects competitive outcomes 
in the mobile wireless service market. Competition is also shaped by the 
provider-as-retailer model of handset distribution.96 “Bundling contracts 
and exclusive handset arrangements are firm conduct that occurs frequently 
in the provider-as-retailer model of handset distribution.”97  
  The merger removes a company that buys and subsidizes handsets. 
The loss of a significant competitor means that handset manufacturers have 
one less customer they could turn to, or threaten to turn to, in negotiations 
with mobile service providers. Moreover, consumers may see their choices 
of handsets narrowed after the merger. Consumer costs for phones could 
also increase as the merged company faces less competitive pressure to 
subsidize phone prices as much as before. Another possible effect is that 
the growth of Android-based devices98 will be slowed. T-Mobile has been 
the leader in offering these devices as a means of countering the iPhone. 
There are numerous trade press reports and advertisements showing this 
ongoing competition.99 
The introduction of Android software and devices is summarized in 
the FCC’s Thirteenth Mobile Wireless Competition Report as follows: 
171. The Twelfth Report noted that the development of Android was 
announced in November 2007 by the Open Handset Alliance—an 
alliance of 34 handset makers, wireless providers and other technology 
companies led by Google Inc. (“Google”), T-Mobile, High Tech 
Computer Corporation (“HTC”), Qualcomm, and Motorola which was 
formed to accelerate innovation and “openness” in the provision of 
mobile wireless services. The Twelfth Report further noted that 
Android was intended to be the “first open, complete, and free platform 
created specifically for mobile devices,” and that it was set to be 
commercially deployed in the second half of 2008. 
172. As revealed in subsequent reports about its development, the 
Android system is a set of operating software developed by Google 
that is designed to support several different objectives. First, Android 
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96. 14th Mobile Wireless Competition Report, supra note 23, at para. 311. 
 97. Id. 
98. Google Projects for Android, GOOGLE CODE, http://code.google.com/android/ (last 
visited Nov. 15, 2011) (“Android is a software stack for mobile devices that includes an 
operating system, middleware, and key applications.”). 
 99. See, e.g., Walt Mossberg, Google Answers the iPhone, ALL THINGS DIGITAL (Oct. 
15, 2008, 9:02 PM), http://ptech.allthingsd.com/20081015/google-answers-the-iphone/. 
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supports and brings together in one package a number of applications 
Google has developed for mobile handsets, including a search service, 
Google maps and a new advanced mobile Web browser that is intended 
to rival the browser on the Apple iPhone. Second, Android provides a 
platform to support a marketplace for applications made by other 
companies. Like Apple’s software development kit and App Store, 
Android is designed to make it easier for third-party software 
developers to make their applications available on mobile handsets and 
to integrate these applications with handset features such as location-
sensing technology. Third, despite its use of Google’s search service 
and other Google applications, the Android system allows wireless 
service providers to customize the Android software to promote their 
own data services and content. Google is making the Android 
operating software available free of charge to handset manufacturers 
[sic] and wireless service providers in order to encourage the 
development and deployment of handsets based on Android. 
173. Although Google originally planned to launch the new Android 
handsets in the second half of 2008, subsequently the company 
indicated that the handsets would not be commercially available until 
the fourth quarter of 2008. Several factors contributed to the delays, 
including: (1) the inherent difficulty of managing a project in which 
Google had to collaborate with and coordinate the work of many 
different providers to support its Android technology platform, 
including handset manufacturers, wireless service providers, software 
developers and chip set makers; (2) challenges wireless service 
providers have encountered in their efforts to customize the Android 
software and brand their own devices; and (3) various challenges that 
confronted software developers in working with Google’s 
programming tools and creating programs for Android. 
174. Google and T-Mobile unveiled the first Android device, the G1, in 
September 2008, and the following month T-Mobile became the first 
U.S. provider to launch a handset that uses the Android operating 
system. The G1 runs on both T-Mobile’s mobile broadband 
WCDMA/HSDPA network, which T-Mobile is still in the early stages 
of rolling out, and also on slower networks using older GSM-family 
technologies. In addition to Google’s advanced new mobile Web 
browser, search interface and other Google applications such as maps, 
Gmail and YouTube, the G1 also features a touch-screen that slides 
open to reveal a real physical keypad underneath, a trackball that 
supplements the touch-screen navigation, GPS navigation, Wi-Fi 
access and Bluetooth connections, among other gadgets and functions. 
Although the Google applications come installed on the G1, the G1 has 
an applications store, called the Android Market, where G1 users will 
be able to download programs created by third-party developers. 
However, while Google maintains that the G1 leaves it up to 
consumers to decide what they want to run on their cellphones, one 
reviewer points out that the G1 is “tightly tied to Google’s Web-based 
email, contacts and calendar programs.” Nevertheless, while noting 
many differences between the G1 and Apple’s iPhone, the same 
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reviewer concludes that, like Apple’s product, Google’s G1 is “a 
serious handheld computer with a powerful new operating system.”100  
Choice of devices is important to consumers, who increasingly are 
choosing a wireless service based on the devices that are available. 
According to the FCC’s Fourteenth Mobile Wireless Competition Report: 
299. Handsets and devices are becoming increasingly central to the 
dynamics of the overall wireless market. Recent studies show handsets 
playing an increasingly important role for consumers as a basis for 
choosing providers, although these studies differ as to the level of 
importance of handsets to consumers. For example, a recent report 
from Consumers Union provides data that suggests that many 
consumers switched to new wireless service providers in order to 
obtain a particular handset. Specifically, the report states that during 
the two-year period of 2008 through 2009, 38 percent of respondents 
who had switched providers did so because it was the only way to 
obtain the handset that they wanted. The same report also indicates that 
27 percent of all respondents had a specific wireless handset in mind 
when they went shopping for a new handset. A first quarter 2009 
survey by Nielsen Company shows handsets were the seventh most 
important reason consumers chose their existing wireless provider, 
although handset choice increased in importance to 6.4 percent from 
2.9 percent in the third quarter of 2006. Recent analyst reports also 
identify access to handsets as an increasing challenge faced by mid-
sized and small providers.101 
 Viewed from a handset manufacturer’s perspective, the acquisition 
removes a significant buyer from the market. This is likely to have a 
nontrivial impact on handset manufacturers’ ability to negotiate. It is 
possible that the change will also reinforce AT&T’s incentives to compete 
for exclusive deals, and Verizon will also find this to be the most viable 
strategy. This could easily result in Sprint not being a fully competitive 
alternative, putting further pressure on its long-term survival given the 
trends showing the importance of handset choice.  
2.  Text Messages 
Text message prices may be an example of successfully coordinated 
conduct in the wireless industry. The theory is that with only a few firms 
offering the service, it is relatively easy for those firms to coordinate on 
pricing, and there does seem to be some evidence that such coordination 
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1993, Thirteenth Report, 24 F.C.C.R. 6185, para. 171–74 (2009), http://hraunfoss.fcc. 
gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-09-54A1.pdf (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
101.  14th Mobile Wireless Competition Report, supra note 23, at para. 299 (citations 
omitted).  
Number 1] AT&T/T-MOBILE 71 
has in fact occurred. According to Senator Herb Kohl, who oversaw Senate 
hearings in 2009 on text message prices:  
As their popularity has grown, so has the price charged on a per 
message basis. From 2006 to 2008, the price of sending and receiving a 
text message among the four largest cell phone carriers increased by 
100%–from 10 to 20 cents per message. The four companies increased 
their text messaging prices in two steps–first from 10 to 15 cents, and 
then from 15 to 20 cents–within weeks or even days of each other. 
These lockstep price increases occurred despite the fact that the cost to 
the phone companies to carry text messages is minimal–estimated to be 
less than a penny per message–and has not increased.102 
 The Seventh Circuit recently affirmed the district court’s decision not 
to dismiss a conspiracy case alleging text messaging price-fixing against 
the four national carriers.103 The Court of Appeals noted, among other 
things, that the four defendants sold ninety percent of U.S. text messaging 
services; it would not be difficult for such a small group to agree on prices 
and to be able to detect “cheating”; prices had been declining; and “all at 
once the defendants changed their pricing structures, which were 
heterogeneous and complex, to a uniform pricing structure, and then 
simultaneously jacked up their prices by a third.”104 
Pricing of text messages may present a natural experiment on 
coordinated pricing behavior in the industry. The use of text messages 
rapidly expanded in 2008–2009, and the industry at that point apparently 
was sufficiently concentrated for coordinated interaction to occur. It is also 
possible that going from four to three “national” firms will result in even 
higher text message prices, which would be a merger effect.  
3.  Parallel Accommodating Conduct 
The 1997 Merger Guidelines stated that “[s]uccessful coordinated 
interaction entails reaching terms of coordination that are profitable to the 
firms involved and an ability to detect and punish deviations that would 
undermine the coordinated interaction.”105 The text message example 
above is an illustration of a potentially profitable strategy that includes the 
ability to detect and punish deviations. But economic theory has recognized 
for some time that there are forms of coordinated interaction that are 
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Pricing (June 16, 2009), http:// http://kohl.senate.gov/newsroom/pressrelease.cfm?customel_ 
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 104. Id. at 628. 
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profitable but do not involve the requirement (borrowed from classic cartel 
theory) that the firms involved be able to “detect and punish” cheating.106  
The revised 2010 Merger Guidelines refine the analysis and bring it 
into line with economic theory. The new Merger Guidelines identify three 
kinds of coordinated behavior: (1) “explicit negotiation of a common 
understanding of how firms will compete or refrain from competing”; (2) 
“a similar common understanding that is not explicitly negotiated but 
would be enforced by the detection and punishment of deviations . . . ”; and 
(3) “parallel accommodating conduct not pursuant to a prior 
understanding.”107  
In discussing parallel accommodating conduct, the revised Merger 
Guidelines state: “Parallel accommodating conduct includes situations in 
which each rival’s response to competitive moves made by others is 
individually rational, and not motivated by retaliation or deterrence nor 
intended to sustain an agreed-upon market outcome, but nevertheless 
emboldens price increases and weakens competitive incentives to reduce 
prices or offer customers better terms.”108 There is no need for the 
participants to “detect and punish” cheating. 
DOJ was concerned about parallel accommodating conduct in its 
challenges to the Worldcom/Sprint and Alcan/Pechiney mergers.109 In 
language that may prove equally applicable here, DOJ alleged in Alcan: 
“[a]fter the acquisition, the combined firm and its largest North American 
rival would share market leadership and a common incentive to pursue 
strategies that emphasize accommodation and do not risk provocation.”110  
4.  Unilateral Effects 
Alternatively, the merger can be analyzed under a unilateral effects 
theory. In the context of the incipiency standard, the agencies’ unilateral 
effects analysis is better viewed as a complement for cases where market 
definition is less straightforward. In differentiated product industries, some 
products can be very close substitutes and compete strongly with each 
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other, while other products are more distant substitutes and compete less 
strongly. A merger between firms selling differentiated products may 
diminish competition by enabling the merged firm to profit by unilaterally 
raising the price of one or both products above the premerger level. So, as 
one recent example, DOJ can challenge a merger involving “value” 
shampoo, conditioners, and hairspray.111 Whether the market is defined as 
shampoo generally or value shampoo specifically, the antitrust agency can 
predict that the prices for one or both of the merging firms’ product will 
increase postmerger. The agency will base its prediction on diversion 
ratios, the estimated consumer demand at postmerger prices, and the profit 
margins of the merging parties’ hair products.112 
The problem is that unilateral effects theory has become the opium of 
merger review. If the agency can predict the likely postmerger price 
increases for value shampoos, white pan bread, or baby wipes, then the 
merging parties and courts will demand the FTC and DOJ prove for every 
merger how prices will increase postmerger, and by what magnitude. It is 
not surprising then that most merger cases in recent years are challenged 
under a unilateral effects theory.113 However, as one former head of the 
Antitrust Division observed, 
[U]nilateral effects should not be the theory of choice simply by 
default. If we reach too quickly for unilateral effects theories to the 
exclusion of meaningful coordinated effects analysis, we might miss 
important cases that should be brought or craft our relief too narrowly 
in cases that we actually pursue.114 
Where market definition and entry barriers are relatively 
straightforward, it is questionable whether DOJ needs to rely on a unilateral 
effects theory, the utility of which is where market definition is less 
straightforward or meaningful (such as whether the market is defined as 
value shampoos or shampoo generally). Nonetheless, we discuss below 
how a unilateral effects theory applies here. But we do so with the 
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important caveat that the incipiency standard controls. The fact that DOJ 
can show that the merger significantly increases the likelihood of a 
substantial unilateral price increase simply provides additional evidence of 
why the merger violates the Clayton Act.  
Although the Merger Guidelines outline several types of unilateral 
effects, the most likely candidate theory here involves pricing of 
differentiated products:  
The concept of unilateral effects is simple to describe: In markets 
characterized by product differentiation, mergers between close 
competitors are likely to lead to higher prices absent postmerger 
repositioning of other products in the market and/or efficiencies. In the 
usual case, the merging firms sell products (A and B) that consumers 
perceive to be close competitive substitutes for each other. Other 
products, while perhaps being functional substitutes on some level, are 
viewed by the consumers of A and B to be substantially differentiated 
from A and B in terms of product attributes, such that changes in the 
prices of A or B do not lead consumers to choose other products in 
significant numbers. After A and B come under common control, the 
price of A could be raised because many of the consumers of A would 
switch to B, the profits of which, instead of being lost by the firm 
selling A, would now be captured by the merged firm. Other 
consumers would stay with A and pay [the] higher price . . . . 
 It is the diversion of consumers from A to B, compared to a diversion 
to any other products, that permits a postmerger price increase. (Note 
that the same could be said about increases in the price of B leading to 
significant diversion to A[)].115  
It is beyond this Article’s scope to analyze “upward pricing pressure” or 
diversion ratios. However, several observations may be offered.  
It seems likely that the parties are relatively close substitutes. First, 
they offer similar plans and services, although, T-Mobile tries to price 
somewhat lower and also has somewhat lower profit margins.116  
Second, it is likely that the real market for “low-end” customers is in 
prepaid plans as opposed to postpaid plans. Prepaid plans are a way to cut 
costs and avoid the lengthy contracts that come with traditional cell phone 
plans. Prepaid plans have been growing rapidly (probably because of the 
recession) but they generate much lower revenue per subscriber than 
postpaid plans.117  
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If the DOJ applies an “upward pricing pressure” analysis, the result is 
likely to confirm the intuition (and fear) of many T-Mobile customers: that 
AT&T has an incentive to raise T-Mobile prices postmerger. AT&T has 
both a significantly higher market share and significantly higher margins 
than T-Mobile. If AT&T raises T-Mobile prices postmerger, it will likely 
recapture a high enough percentage of defecting T-Mobile customers that 
the price increase will be profitable. On the other hand, AT&T probably 
has much less of an incentive to raise prices on its own customers 
postmerger. 
Indeed, AT&T’s own unilateral effects analysis in past transactions 
highlights this concern. In its November 2008 FCC filing in connection 
with the acquisition of Centennial Communications, AT&T argued that 
Centennial was not a particularly close substitute because “AT&T focuses 
on the other national carriers in its competitive decision making and does 
not consider Centennial in deciding on pricing and service offerings.”118 It 
recognized that the number of competitors and share of the merging firms 
were relevant.119 And it is worth noting that AT&T’s past arguments about 
the ease of competitive repositioning do not square with its own repeated 
statements in this merger about the increasing demands consumers are 
placing on wireless networks.120  
5.  Exclusionary Effects 
Finally, the merger can be analyzed under an exclusionary effects 
theory. The theory is that a merger may enable the merged firm to engage 
in exclusionary conduct after the merger—for example, by denying rivals 
access to needed inputs, by cutting off their access to customers, or 
otherwise by raising their costs.121 When a merger enhances the ability of a 
firm to exclude rivals, the result may be harm to competition. The harmful 
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effects of exclusionary practices have been recognized both in case law122 
and by economists123 for many years.  
The 2010 Merger Guidelines now explicitly make this theory part of 
the antitrust review. Section 2.2.3 of the Merger Guidelines expresses 
skepticism toward most competitor concerns about competitive effects, but 
contains an exception for exclusionary conduct: 
Information from firms that are rivals to the merging parties can help 
illuminate how the market operates. The interests of rival firms often 
diverge from the interests of customers, since customers normally lose, 
but rival firms gain, if the merged entity raises its prices. For that 
reason, the Agencies do not routinely rely on the overall views of rival 
firms regarding the competitive effects of the merger. However, rival 
firms may provide relevant facts, and even their overall views may be 
instructive, especially in cases where the Agencies are concerned that 
the merged entity may engage in exclusionary conduct.124  
 This theory of harm is particularly relevant to the AT&T/T-Mobile 
merger. The merging parties have asserted that smaller regional and local 
carriers will replace any competition lost through the merger, and, 
therefore, will constrain AT&T from exercising market power post- 
merger. For this claim to be true, the smaller carriers must be able to 
develop and grow into a significant competitive force in the marketplace. If 
the merged firm can make it significantly more expensive for the smaller 
companies to operate, or otherwise act to block or limit their growth, the 
parties’ claim becomes highly suspect.  
Exclusionary theories are put forward in a number of the comments 
on the merger filed with the FCC. As one example, Cincinnati Bell 
Wireless (“CBW”) is a regional carrier that serves approximately 509,000 
subscribers in the greater Cincinnati and Dayton metropolitan areas as well 
as several counties in Indiana and northern Kentucky.125 Like AT&T and 
T-Mobile, CBW is a GSM-based carrier (GSM or Global System for 
Mobile Communications is the most prevalent standard for technologies in 
cellular networks). Because the parties hold out CBW as one of the 
regional carriers that would allegedly replace the competition lost by the 
merger, it is worth noting the difference in their relative sizes. Postmerger, 
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the combined AT&T and T-Mobile would be approximately 250 times the 
size of CBW, yet CBW would be the second largest GSM-based carrier in 
the country.126 
Regional carriers like CBW must give their customers the ability to 
roam out of the local region onto the networks of other carriers. Because 
CBW is GSM-based, the only two current choices for a roaming partner in 
most markets are AT&T and T-Mobile,127 and the company currently has 
roaming contracts with both of them.  
CBW states that AT&T’s rates for voice and data roaming are 
approximately twice as high as T-Mobile’s rates.128 Postmerger, AT&T 
would be the only remaining 3G roaming alternative since AT&T has 
already announced its intention to shut down T-Mobile’s 3G network.129 
And CBW claims that in the past, AT&T has engaged in repeated acts of 
exclusionary conduct, including: 
charging unreasonable roaming rates; denying roaming access on its 
advanced data networks and opening access only after severe delays, at 
unreasonably high rates, and upon anticompetitive conditions; 
preventing access to contiguous or quality spectrum by buying it up 
through both auctions and merger; and denying access to new and 
innovative handset technology by tying manufacturers into exclusive 
arrangements and specifying “single carrier” handset designs 
developed for use only on its network.130  
It does not require much imagination to see how the proposed merger could 
make things appreciably worse for firms like CBW and consumers. Losing 
T-Mobile as a supplier both exposes CBW to a roaming rate increase and 
increases its vulnerability to further exclusionary conduct by AT&T. Far 
from being able to grow and provide meaningful competition to the merged 
firm, CBW and similar firms are likely to be hemmed in if not further 
marginalized.  
As a final point, the agencies most often encounter exclusionary 
conduct in vertical mergers or in mergers with a vertical dimension, such as 
where the merged firm supplies needed inputs to customers who are also 
competitors.131 But there can be exclusionary effects on a purely horizontal 
                                                                                                                 
 126. Id. at 15–16. 
 127. Id. at 3. 
 128. Id. at 16. 
 129. Id. at 6. 
 130. Id. at ii (emphasis omitted).  
131. Jonathan B. Baker, Comcast/NBCU: The FCC Provides a Roadmap for Vertical 
Merger Analysis, 25-SPG ANTITRUST 36, 37 (2011) (noting how vertical mergers can harm 
competition by facilitating exclusion by foreclosing “unaffiliated downstream rivals from 
access to the integrated firm's upstream product (input foreclosure), and foreclosure of 
unaffiliated upstream rivals from access to the integrated firm's downstream business 
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basis as well. The Merger Guidelines provide an example of such 
exclusionary effects in an industry characterized by “network effects.” 
Broadly speaking, there are “network effects” if one person’s adoption of a 
good (a) benefits other adopters of the good and (b) increases others’ 
incentives to adopt it.132  
Merging Firms A and B operate in a market in which network effects 
are significant, implying that any firm’s product is significantly more 
valuable if it commands a large market share or if it is interconnected 
with others that in aggregate command such a share. Prior to the 
merger, they and their rivals voluntarily interconnect with one another. 
The merger would create an entity with a large enough share that a 
strategy of ending voluntary interconnection would have a dangerous 
probability of creating monopoly power in this market. The interests of 
rivals and of consumers would be broadly aligned in preventing such a 
merger.133 
Telecommunications is an industry subject to significant network effects. 
Indeed, the telephone is a classic example of network effects. In the early, 
unregulated era of telephone service, the dominant Bell system simply 
refused to interconnect with independent local phone companies.134  
The existence of network effects in the mobile wireless industry may 
be seen in handset exclusivity. As the FCC noted, exclusive contracting for 
handsets only takes place “with providers that have larger customer bases 
and extensive network penetration.”135 Indeed, the FCC notes that while all 
of the four nationwide providers have some exclusive arrangements, the 
non-nationwide providers typically do not.136  
In what ways could the merger change the strategy of the merging 
parties given the existence of network effects? One possibility is that the 
merger will further enhance AT&T’s incentive and ability to demand 
handset exclusivity. A second possibility is that AT&T, which currently 
has reciprocal roaming agreements with several carriers,137 could find itself 
                                                                                                                 
(customer foreclosure)”). 
 132.  Joseph Farrell & Paul Klemperer, Coordination and Lock-In: Competition with 
Switching Costs and Network Effects, in 3 HANDBOOK OF INDUS. ORG. 1967 (Mark 
Armstrong and Robert Porter eds., 2007). 
 133.  2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 42, § 2.2.3, at 6. 
 134.  Wu, supra note 22, at 45–50. 
 135.  Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 
1993, Fifteenth Report, 25 F.C.C.R. 11407, para. 342 (2011). WT Docket No. 10-133, 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-11-103A1.pdf. 
 136.  Id. 
137.  See Joint Opposition of AT&T Inc., Deutsche Telekom Ag, and T-Mobile USA, 
Inc. to Petitions to Deny and Reply to Comments at 156-58, Applications of AT&T Inc. and 
Deutsche Telekom AG (No. 11-65) (2011), http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view? 
id=7021686831. 
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in a position after the merger where it no longer needs those carriers as 
roaming partners. Reciprocal roaming agreements, according to AT&T, 
provide a check on roaming rates since the parties need each other.138 
Postmerger, the situation may be more like AT&T and CBW, where CBW 
roams on AT&T’s network but not vice versa.139  
A third possibility involves network infrastructure. T-Mobile was a 
founding member of the “Open Handset Alliance,” a broad alliance of 
technology and wireless firms that joined forces to develop the Android 
platform.140 Such an alliance requires the possibility of a return on 
considerable investments. One can readily imagine a postmerger world in 
which the inability to reach a sufficient number of wireless customers 
would make it impossible for a firm or group of firms to recoup their 
investments, and, as a result, the investments would not be made.  
V. REMEDIES 
As Part III shows, this merger is presumptively anticompetitive. As 
Part IV discusses, AT&T and T-Mobile in their public documents have not 
overcome this presumption of illegality by (i) showing how consumers will 
overall benefit with merger-specific efficiencies and (ii) rebutting the 
presumption that the significant increase in concentration, in an already 
highly-concentrated industry, will increase the likelihood of tacit collusion. 
Consequently, looming large is the question of remedy. At the end of the 
day, if DOJ concludes that the merger violates the Clayton Act, what is the 
cure? There are three possibilities: sue to block the merger, agree to 
divestitures, or agree to behavioral conditions. 
In the past several years, wireless mergers involving the four national 
facilities-based providers have mostly involved an expansion of coverage, 
and the entities that were combined for the most part had not competed in 
most of the geographic areas. Where there was overlap, the FCC required 
divestitures. A chart of the recent mergers appears below.141 
 
                                                                                                                 
138. Reply of Cincinnati Bell Wireless LLC at 5, Applications for Consent to the 
Transfer of Control of Licenses at 5, Applications of AT&T Inc. and Deutsche Telekom AG 
(No. 11-65) (2011), available at http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id= 
7021688585. 
 139.  Id.  
 140.  Press Release, Industry Leaders Announce Open Platform for Mobile Devices 
(Nov. 5, 2007), available at http://www.openhandsetalliance.com/press_110507.html. 
141. 14th Mobile Wireless Competition Report, supra note 23, at para. 75, Table 9. 
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Year of 
Commission 
Approval 
Merger 
2005 Sprint/Nextel 
2007 AT&T/Dobson 
2008 AT&T/Aloha 
T-Mobile/Suncom 
Verizon Wireless/Rural Cellular 
Verizon Wireless/Alltel 
Sprint Nextel/Clearwire 
2009 AT&T/Centennial 
 
Significantly, according to the FCC, most of the divestitures in the 
Verizon/Rural Cellular and Verizon/Alltel mergers were to go to AT&T. 
Most of the divestitures in the AT&T/Centennial merger were to go to 
Verizon.142 Assuming this took place, it shows how few potential buyers 
there were, and that the FCC and DOJ were apparently willing to accept an 
increase in national market concentration to remedy local concerns. The 
question is whether the same analysis would apply here when the present 
acquisition (i) would increase concentration nationally and in numerous 
local markets, and (ii) is not a geographic expansion. At a minimum, it is 
highly unlikely that either the FCC or DOJ would accept divestitures to 
Verizon in the present merger. In addition, DOJ prefers to have a single 
buyer on the theory that a merger that removes a single competitor is best 
remedied by replacing the single competitor with another as opposed to a 
group.143 But divesting assets to someone who is already in the market 
does not really remedy the competitive loss caused by a merger.144  
                                                                                                                 
 142. Id. at para. 84. 
143. Indeed, the DOJ guidelines on merger remedies refer to a single purchaser of the 
assets. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIV., ANTITRUST DIVISION POLICY GUIDE TO 
MERGER REMEDIES (June 2011), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/272350.pdf 
[hereinafter 2011 Policy Guide to Merger Remedies]. 
144. DOJ noted that its approval will be conditioned on three fundamental tests, one of 
which is that the “divestiture of the assets to the proposed purchaser must not itself cause 
competitive harm”:  
For example, if the concern is that the merger will enhance an already 
dominant firm’s ability unilaterally to exercise market power, divestiture to 
another large competitor in the market is not likely to be acceptable, although 
divestiture to a fringe incumbent might. If the concern is one of coordinated 
effects among a small set of postmerger competitors, divestiture to any firm in 
that set would itself raise competitive issues. In that situation, the Division 
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A. Behavioral Remedies 
Behavioral conditions or behavioral remedies include imposing the 
requirement that the merged company agree to price or access terms, or 
otherwise change its conduct. For example, if there is concern that AT&T 
could disadvantage its competitors by charging excessive special access 
fees, AT&T could be ordered to provide access on reasonable and 
nondiscriminatory terms. If there is concern about exclusive agreements 
with handset manufacturers, AT&T could agree not to enter such exclusive 
agreements.  
DOJ, under the Obama Administration, has been receptive to 
behavioral remedies, whereby DOJ permits a merger but regulates the 
behavior of the merging parties.145 Historically, based on sound practical 
reasons, the antitrust agencies preferred structural remedies (requiring 
divestiture of assets) over behavioral ones.  
Behavioral remedies are unattractive for many reasons, as DOJ itself 
has recognized.146 DOJ is not set up as a regulatory agency. The staff that 
works on this merger will be disbanded and move on to other matters when 
the review is finished. The head of DOJ Antitrust Division from both 
Republican and Democratic parties have said that DOJ is not, and should 
not be, in the business of ongoing oversight of remedies. Indeed, to the 
extent that DOJ is market-oriented, behavioral remedies are perverse, in 
that they limit the ability of a firm to make market-based decisions, and 
they are by necessity applied only to the merged firm and not to its 
competitors.  
Thus, behavioral remedies should be used only when no other 
alternative exists, such as in vertical mergers where the main theory of 
harm is that rivals will be foreclosed from the market.147 In 
telecommunications mergers, they tend to be used mostly for the sake of 
parallel orders.148 If the FCC wants to impose a behavioral remedy, DOJ 
may also include it in a decree. But it should be understood that adding 
                                                                                                                 
likely would approve divestiture only to a firm outside that set. 
Id. at 28. 
 145. Id. at 12–13.  
 146. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION POLICY GUIDE TO MERGER REMEDIES 
8–9 (Oct. 2004, rev. 2011), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/205108.htm. 
 147. 2011 Policy Guide to Merger Remedies, supra note 143, at 2 (“[C]onduct 
remedies often can effectively address anticompetitive issues raised by vertical mergers.”). 
148. See, e.g., Philip J. Weiser, Reexamining the Legacy of Dual Regulation: 
Reforming Dual Merger Review by the DOJ and the FCC, 61 FED. COMM. L.J. 167, 179 
(2008) (“When the DOJ imposes a behavioral requirement to address concerns about 
vertical relations, it often replicates or anticipates efforts taken by the FCC.”). The author 
goes on to give several examples. 
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behavioral remedies to a consent decree usually accomplishes little, if 
anything, from DOJ’s standpoint—it is done because it is a relatively low-
cost, even if relatively low-return, proposition. 
B. Divestitures 
Partial divestiture of assets by one or both of the merging firms is a 
different story. Divestitures may be ordered if only parts of a deal are 
problematic. In a horizontal merger, divestitures are used to fix 
competitively significant overlaps.149 If the acquiring company offers many 
products, but only competes with the acquired company in one of those 
products, that product line may be divested. Or if the acquiring company 
competes with the acquired company in only one geographic location, its 
business in that location may be divested. So the first point is that 
divestitures generally only make sense when the problematic overlaps are 
small relative to the size of the deal.  
A second issue is, who is the buyer? Divestitures, like any remedy, 
are intended to replace the competition lost through a merger. This has led 
to a number of requirements being imposed on a prospective buyer before 
DOJ will approve the buyer. For example, you do not want a buyer who 
has never managed a business like the one being divested. Firms who enter 
new and unfamiliar businesses often fail.150 For similar reasons, you do not 
want a buyer who is undercapitalized and needs to rely on the merged 
company to provide financing. That buyer may pull its punches because it 
is on the hook to the merged company. You also do not want the divested 
assets sold to several smaller buyers. While each of those buyers may be 
fine, they are also individually weaker than the original firm was, and, 
therefore, may be less effective competitors. Finally, you want an entire 
business divested, not just pieces of the business. History teaches that 
divestitures of complete businesses are much more likely to succeed than 
just certain assets or licenses.151  
So let us apply these well-accepted principles to the current AT&T/T-
Mobile merger. First, the overlaps here are not small relative to the size of 
                                                                                                                 
149. 2011 Policy Guide to Merger Remedies, supra note 143, at 5 (“Divestiture of 
overlapping assets, usually an existing business entity, can effectively preserve competition 
that the merger otherwise would eliminate.”). 
150. STAFF OF THE BUREAU OF COMPETITION OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, A 
STUDY OF THE COMMISSION’S DIVESTITURE PROCESS 23 (1999) (“mistakes by buyers are 
inherent in the acquisition process, particularly where buyers have no previous experience in 
the market.”). 
151. 2011 Policy Guide to Merger Remedies, supra note 143, at 8 (“The Federal Trade 
Commission Divestiture Study found that divestitures of on-going businesses succeeded at a 
higher rate than divestitures of selected assets.”) (footnote omitted). 
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the deal. This is not a geographic expansion merger involving a handful of 
competitive overlaps, as was the case with prior wireless mergers.152 As 
previously stated, the relevant geographic market in this case appears 
national. But even on a local market basis, there are likely to be hundreds 
of local markets where AT&T and T-Mobile compete for customers, and 
where both are among the top four competitors. If DOJ finds likely 
competitive effects in all or most of those local markets, divestiture 
becomes an unattractive remedy. 
Second is the question of the identity of the buyer. The goal is to have 
a buyer (or buyers) that will restore the competition lost by the 
disappearance of T-Mobile. A large buyer like Sprint would be one option, 
but only in those markets where it does not have a sizeable presence 
already. Otherwise, even with a divestiture, the number of players is being 
reduced postmerger. 
A small buyer may be unattractive, since it may be unable to deliver 
what T-Mobile did for its customers. For example, a small carrier may 
depend more on its larger rivals than T-Mobile does. And that could end up 
meaning it has a higher cost structure, or is dependent on its competitors, in 
ways that T-Mobile is not. 
Third is the question of what assets are being divested. The answer 
has to be primarily licenses for spectrum. And here we run into another 
problem. If, AT&T asserts it needs T-Mobile’s spectrum, what are the 
merging parties going to divest? Spectrum. But since spectrum is the driver 
of the deal, it does not make sense that AT&T will simply sell off T-
Mobile’s spectrum everywhere that there is overlap. Rather, the likely 
result would be “mix and match” divestitures.153 AT&T will be willing to 
divest the spectrum that it does not need, but keep the spectrum that it 
needs or is more desirable. We have seen something similar happen in 
radio mergers, where the merged company keeps the bigger stations and 
agrees to divest the smaller ones. AT&T’s antitrust counsel would likely 
offer the same deal. Of course, it may happen by chance that a buyer needs 
precisely the same spectrum that AT&T is willing to divest, but that is 
                                                                                                                 
152. The four current nationwide facilities-based mobile telephone providers largely 
built their nationwide footprints through various mergers and acquisitions. A number of the 
more recent acquisitions are described in the FCC’s Thirteenth Mobile Wireless 
Competition Report. Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1993, Thirteenth Report, 24 F.C.C.R. 6185, paras. 52–62, (WTB 
2009), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-09-54A1.pdf. 
153. A “mix and match” divestiture is one that includes some of the acquiring firm’s 
assets and some of the acquired firm’s assets. See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions about 
Merger Consent Order Provisions, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, http://www.ftc.gov/bc/ 
mergerfaq.shtm (last visited Nov. 15, 2011). 
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unlikely to happen. A profit-maximizing firm does not pay thirty-nine 
billion dollars in order to sell competitors the best spectrum. 
So what is the argument in favor of divestitures? In the larger or urban 
geographic markets in which the merging parties compete, AT&T will 
likely argue that it need not divest anything. Those are the local markets 
where its needs are most acute. It will undoubtedly argue that these are also 
the markets that have the most provider choices, and also that T-Mobile is 
not much of a competitive factor, especially in the 4G future.  
In the smaller or rural overlap markets, where there is less choice, 
AT&T probably would be willing to divest. Indeed, its likely endgame is to 
limit its divestitures just to those markets. Why? That solves a couple of the 
problems mentioned above. First, it means that the divestitures become a 
much smaller part of the overall deal. Second, it means that buyers can 
probably be found and approved. Third, the buyer will likely not pose a 
significant competitive threat to AT&T nationwide postmerger.  
During the DOJ investigation, the merging parties’ endgame most 
likely was to keep the DOJ focused on narrowly-defined geographic 
markets, progressively attempting to whittle down the number of 
geographic markets where DOJ had concerns. By compartmentalizing the 
merger into small regions, AT&T and T-Mobile could hope to horse trade 
with DOJ on the divesture of assets in smaller markets like Knoxville, 
Tennessee. There is nothing sinister with this strategy; indeed, it happens 
regularly at the agencies. While we were at DOJ in the 1990s–2000s, we 
saw this piecemeal approach for radio154 and bank mergers.155 In 
retrospect, it is questionable whether these piecemeal divestitures in 
consent decrees actually restored the competition lost by the mergers and 
prevented the risks from the trend toward consolidation. 
Now that DOJ and the states have filed suit, AT&T and T-Mobile are 
likely to follow a similar strategy in any settlement offer they make. 
However, this strategy is made more difficult by the fact that a complaint 
has been filed. Any settlement must remedy the competitive harms alleged 
in the complaint. Because the complaint has alleged harm to numerous 
local markets (including some very large local markets) as well as national 
effects from the merger, a small number of localized divestitures would be 
inadequate to remedy the alleged harm to competition.      
                                                                                                                 
 154. See Maurice E. Stucke & Allen P. Grunes, Why More Antitrust Immunity for the 
Media is a Bad Idea, 105 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 115, 128–30 (2010) (citing Joel I. 
Klein, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., Dept. of Just., Speech at the ANA Hotel: DOJ Analysis 
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C. Enjoining the Merger 
This brings us to the last remedy: blocking the merger. Actually, 
according to the Supreme Court, that is the first remedy courts are 
supposed to consider. On the question of remedies, United States v. E. I. 
Du Pont De Nemours & Co., which is still good law, states:  
The very words of § 7 suggest that an undoing of the acquisition is a 
natural remedy. Divestiture or dissolution has traditionally been the 
remedy for Sherman Act violations whose heart is intercorporate 
combination and control, and it is reasonable to think immediately of 
the same remedy when § 7 of the Clayton Act, which particularizes the 
Sherman Act standard of illegality, is involved. Of the very few 
litigated § 7 cases which have been reported, most decreed divestiture 
as a matter of course. Divestiture has been called the most important of 
antitrust remedies. It is simple, relatively easy to administer, and sure. 
It should always be in the forefront of a court’s mind when a violation 
of § 7 has been found.156 
Given the unattractiveness of behavioral remedies and the likely 
inadequacy of piecemeal divestitures, the preferred remedy seems clear.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
The AT&T/T-Mobile merger is presumptively anticompetitive under 
Philadelphia National Bank. There are important policy reasons for this 
legal presumption, including providing greater certainty to consumers and 
the industry participants, increasing transparency and accountability of the 
antitrust agencies, and reducing the risk of political capture of the 
agencies.157 Here on a national level, this is a four to three merger in a 
highly concentrated industry. The industry, through past mergers, has 
accelerated toward greater concentration. The industry has high entry 
barriers. There is no indication that the market shares overstate competitive 
significance.  
The merging parties must provide convincing evidence to overcome 
the presumption. To date, they have not. AT&T and T-Mobile have not 
established why the market is not susceptible to coordinated effects. There 
is also reason to believe that AT&T could unilaterally raise prices to T-
Mobile’s customers postmerger. At the end of the day, the proposed merger 
likely violates Section 7 of the Clayton Act and should be enjoined. 
                                                                                                                 
 156. United States v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 329–31 
(footnotes omitted). Note that DuPont uses the word “divestiture” to mean complete 
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